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et al.: Right
Jury Trial
BYtoJURY
RIGHT TO TRIAL

U.S. Const. amend. VI:
In all criminalprosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartialjury of the State and
districtwherein the crime shall have been committed ....
N.Y. CoNST. art. I § 2:
Trial by jury in all cases in which it has been heretofore been
guaranteed by constitutional provision shall remain inviolate
forever; but a jury trial may be waived by the parties in all civil
cases in the mannerto be prescribedby law. The legislature may
provide, however, by law, that a verdict may be rendered by not
less thanfive-sixths of the jury in any civil case. A jury trial may
be waived by the defendant in all criminal cases, except those in
which the crime charged may be punishable by death, by a
written instrument signed by the defendant in person in open
court before and with the approval of a judge orjustice of a court
having jurisdiction to try the offense. The legislature may enact
laws, not inconsistent herewith, governing the form, content,
manner and time of presentation of the instrument effectuating
such waiver.

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
SECOND DEPARTMENT
Hynes v. Tomei'
(decided December 22, 1997)
On July 18, 1997, defendant, Michael Shane Hale, sought to
avoid the death penalty by pleading guilty to the crimes of second
In
degree murder, kidnapping and first degree robbery.
Law
Procedure
accordance with New York's Criminal
1 666
2

N.Y.S.2d 687 (2d Dep't 1997).

Id. at 689.
1135
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[hereinafter "CPL"], 3 the People consented to this guilty plea in
exchange for a sentence of fifty years to life imprisonment,
thereby allowing Hale to avoid the possibility of a death sentence,
as was being sought under the indictment.4 Before the plea
agreement, Hale had moved
for a declaration that New York's
"plea bargain provisions ' are "unconstitutional on their face.", 6
In essence, defendant Hale argued, and New York Supreme

Court Justice Albert Tomei agreed, that these statutory provisions
"unconstitutionally penalize a capital defendant's right to a jury
trial." 7

As such, they effectively punish a defendant for

exercising rights protected by both the United States Constitution

3 N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAW § 220.10 (5)(e) (McKinney 1998). This section of
the CPL states in pertinent part:
A defendant may not enter a plea of guilty to the crime of
murder in the first degree as defined in section 125.27 of the
penal law; provided, however, that a defendant may enter
such a plea with both the permission of the court and the
consent of the people when the agreed upon sentence is either
life imprisonment without parole or a term of imprisonment
for the class A-1 felony of murder in the first degree other
than a sentence of life imprisonment without parole.
Id.
4 Hynes, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 688.
1 Id. Hale challenged CPL 220.10 (5)(e), CPL 220.30 (3)(b)(vii) and CPL
220.60
(2)(a), collectively known as "the plea bargain provisions." Id.
6

Id.

7Id.

U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent part:
"No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself .... " Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment
provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed. . . ." Id.
'
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and the New York Constitution9 by placing that defendant in peril
of execution should a jury trial be sought."°
The People brought this Article 78 proceeding" to challenge
Justice Tomei's determination that the plea provisions are invalid
and should "be severed and stricken from the statute."' 2 The
Appellate Division, Second Department, converted the

proceeding into an action for a declaratory judgment, 3 and found
New York's plea bargain provisions constitutional.1 4 The holding
of the court was based on a recognition of the constitutional
safeguards employed by New York's death penalty statute 5 and
an affirmation of the social utility and "judicial acceptance of
plea bargaining." 16 The court concluded that "the determination
of the respondent Tomei to the contrary ... should not be
17
followed.
9 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2. Article I, § 2 of the New York State Constitution
provides in pertinent part: "Trial by jury in all cases in which it has
heretofore been guaranteed by constitutional provision shall remain inviolate
forever. A jury trial may be waived by the defendant in all criminal cases,
except those in which the crime charged may be punishable by death .
Id.
10 Hynes, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 689.
u N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7801 (McKinney 1994).
1 People v. Hale, 173 Misc. 2d 140, 194, 661 N.Y.S.2d 457, 488 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1997) (holding that New York's plea bargain provisions
discourage one's Fifth Amendment right to plead not guilty, as well as one's
Sixth Amendment right to demand a jury trial, by making the guilty plea the
only assurance of avoiding the death penalty).
13 Hynes v. Tomei, 666 N.Y.S.2d 687 (2d Dep't 1997). "The remedy of a
declaratory judgment 'is available in cases where a constitutional question is
involved or the legality or meaning of a statute is in question.. .. '" Id. at
689 (citation omitted).
11 Id. at 693. " Ordered that the proceeding is converted into an action for a
judgment declaring that CPL 220.10(5)(e), CPL 220.30(3)(b)(vii), and CPL
220.60(2)(a) are constitutional." Id.
15Id. at 691. "[IThe death penalty statute in New York provides for a
bifurcated trial where the defendant's guilt, and the sentence to be imposed,
are determined separately by the jury. [The defendant retains all of his or her
constitutional protections .... " Id.
16 Id. at 693 (citing People v. Seaberg, 74 N.Y.2d 1, 7, 541 N.E.2d 1022,
1024, 543 N.Y.S.2d 968, 970 (1989)).
17Id.
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In the underlying case, Michael Shane Hale was charged under
an indictment with varying degrees of murder, kidnapping and
robbery. 8 Following Hale's arraignment, the People filed a
"notice of intent to seek the death penalty" 9 pursuant to the
CPL. 20 Subsequently, Hale moved to find New York's plea
bargain provisions unconstitutional claiming that they
"'effectively penalize[d] his right to a jury trial,' by exposing him
to the risk of death only when he exercised that right." 21 Relying
on the United States Supreme Court ruling in United States v.
Jackson,' Justice Tomei granted defendant's motion and found
that "the plea bargain provisions were unconstitutional in that
they did 'not conform to the requirements of the [F]ifth and
[S]ixth [A]mendments to the United States Constitution, and
corresponding provisions of the New York Constitution.""
While the People were waiting to reargue this issue, they
reached a plea agreement with Hale wherein the People would
consent to Hale's plea of guilty to murder in the second degree,
and Hale would submit to a minimum fifty years term of
imprisonment.'
However, Justice Tomei denied both (1) the
People's motion to reargue the validity of the CPL provisions,
and (2) permission to accept Hale's guilty plea, unless the People
were to withdraw its intent to seek the death penalty.2' In
response, the People filed this Article 78 proceeding seeking
18 Id. at 688.
19 Id.

20 N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAW § 250.40 (McKinney 1998). This section states
in pertinent part: "A sentence of death may not be imposed upon a defendant
convicted of murder in the first degree unless . . . the people file with the

court and serve upon the defendant a notice of intent to seek the death
penalty." Id.
21Hynes, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 688-89.
22 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968) (finding the selective death penalty provision of

the Federal Kidnapping Act unconstitutional in its chilling effect on both the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments and, in its needless encouragement of guilty

pleas).
I Hynes, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 689 (citing People v. Hale, 173 Misc. 2d 140,

185, 661 N.Y.S.2d 457, 483 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1997)).
Id.
25Id.
24
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prohibition of Justice Tomei's order, or in the alternative, a
declaration that the challenged CPL provisions are constitutional
notwithstanding Tomei's earlier ruling. 26
The Appellate Division noted that prohibition is improper in
cases such as these where a statute's constitutionality is at issue.'
Accordingly, the court denied People's request for a writ of
prohibition against Justice Tomei. 2' However, the court chose to
grant the remedy of a declaratory judgment to curtail the effect
that Justice Tomei's far-reaching ruling would most certainly
have had on future cases. 29 In so holding, the court emphasized
the well-respected rule that accords state statutes a strong
presumption of constitutionality.3" Indeed, in People v. Davis,
the Court of Appeals admonished courts not to "substitut[e] their
judgment for that of the Legislature as to the wisdom and
expediency of the legislation." 31
New York's statutory plea bargain provisions allow a capital
defendant to plead guilty only in exchange for a sentence, other
than death, commensurate with murder in the first degree.32
Furthermore, a defendant charged with first degree murder may
only plead guilty with the consent of the People and permission of
the court.33 Justice Tomei found these provisions unconstitutional
because they force a capital defendant to trade away constitutional

2 Id.
27Id.

2 Id.
29 Id. "[A] declaratory judgment may be used to attack a criminal court's
interlocutory ruling when 'the ruling [has] an obvious effect extending far
beyond the matter pending before it so that it is likely that the issue will arise
again with the same result in other cases." Id. at 689 (citation omitted).
30

Id.

31 People v. Davis, 43 N.Y.2d 17, 30, 371 N.E.2d 456, 462, 400 N.Y.S.2d

735, 742 (1977) (finding New York's death penalty statute at the time
unconstitutional for failing to specifically provide for consideration of
mitigating factors).
32
Hynes, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 690.
3' N.Y. Cmi. PROC. LAW §§ 220.10(5)(e), 220.30(3)(b)(vii), 220.60(2)(a)

(McKinney 1998).
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rights in order to avoid risking his/her own life to contest guilt at
trial.

In Jackson, defendant challenged the death penalty provision of
the Federal Kidnapping Act. 3' The district court found the Act to
be unconstitutional "because it makes 'the risk of death' the price
for asserting the right to jury trial, and thereby 'impairs ...free
exercise of that constitutional right."'

36

The United States

Supreme Court refined the lower court's ruling and found only
that portion of the Act that imposes capital punishment at the cost
of an individual's right to jury trial to be unconstitutional, thus
preserving the remainder of the Act as valid.37 Justice Tomei
likened New York's death penalty statute to the invalid provision
of the Federal Kidnapping Act, noting that both statutes authorize
a jury to be the sole arbiter of death. 38 An obvious consequence
then, is that defendants purposefully avoid the exercise of their
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, and Fifth Amendment right

not to plead guilty, specifically to avoid facing a jury and a
possible death sentence. 39 The Court in Jackson characterized
this effect as "evil" in that the Act "needlessly encourages"
guilty pleas. 4°
However, the Appellate Division clearly distinguished the
Federal Kidnapping Act and New York's death penalty statute.4"
4Hynes, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 689.

3118 U.S.C. § 1201(a). This statute provides in pertinent part:

Whoever knowingly transports in interstate... commerce,
any person who has been unlawfully... kidnapped... and
held for ransom ...or otherwise ...shall be punished (1)

by death if the kidnapped person has not been liberated
unharmed and if the verdict of the jury shall so recommend,
or (2) by imprisonment for any term of years or for life, if
the death penalty is not imposed.
Id.

36 United States
37Id. at 572.

v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 571 (1968).

38People v. Hale, 173 Misc. 2d 140, 178-79, 661 N.Y.S.2d 457, 479 (Sup.

Ct. Kings County 1997).
9Id. at 179-80, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 479-80.
40
Jackson, 390 U.S. at 583.
" Hynes v. Tomei, 666 N.Y.S.2d 667, 690-91 (2d Dep't 1997).
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First, the court noted that New York's statute provides for a
bifurcated trial proceeding, where guilt and sentencing are
determined separately by the jury. 42 As such, defendant retains
all constitutional protections during the guilt phase of trial,43 and
is afforded the benefit of presenting mitigating factors at
sentencing.' Secondly, unlike the defendant in Jackson, a capital
defendant in New York does not have the right to plead guilty;
rather, he/she may be allowed to plead guilty at the discretion of
the court and the People as an act of leniency and judicial
economy.45
While Jackson invalidated the death penalty provision of the
Federal Kidnapping Act, courts have since narrowed its impact.46
In Brady v. United States,47 a defendant indicted for kidnapping

under 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) became increasingly fearful of the
death penalty upon learning that his co-defendant had entered a
guilty plea and was preparing to testify against him." Such fear
motivated him to change his plea from not guilty to guilty, and
sentence was imposed accordingly. 49 Later, defendant argued,
"in reliance on Jackson, that the death penalty provision of the
kidnapping statute had needlessly encouraged his guilty plea, and
the waiver of his right to trial, because his plea had been
motivated by a fear of the death penalty." 50 However, the United
States Supreme Court found defendant's interpretation of Jackson
to be overly broad. 51 Contrary to Brady's contention under
Jackson, a guilty plea motivated by the possibility of a death
sentence is not invalid, nor automatically deemed to be
42

Id.at 691.

Id. For example, "he or she is not compelled to take the witness stand,
and the People must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
41

44 Id.
45 Id.

I See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
47 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
4Id.
at 743. The Court noted that the standard for measuring voluntariness
of guilty pleas is not governed by a capital defendant's desire to avoid the
possibility of the death penalty. Id.
49 id.
50

Hynes, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 691.
51Brady, 397 U.S. at 746.
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involuntary.52 In Brady, the judge who accepted defendant's
guilty plea took precautions to make sure that the changed plea
was not coerced; he noted that Brady was represented by
competent counsel throughout the proceedings, was seemingly
well-informed to make this decision and was not compelled
In
beyond knowledge of his confederate's confession. 3
summary, Brady's plea was deemed to be voluntary.54
Similarly, in North Carolina v. Alford,55 a jury heard damaging
evidence against a capital defendant who then entered a plea of
guilty to avoid a likely death penalty. 6 All the while, however,
defendant disavowed his guilt and claimed that he entered a guilty
plea solely to avoid the threat of capital punishment.57 On appeal,

defendant argued, under Jackson, that his guilty plea was
involuntary and motivated by fear of the death penalty.5 Again,
the United States Supreme Court rejected this interpretation of
Jackson, instead upholding the standard from Brady that a plea of
guilty is not "compelled within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment," even if entered solely to avoid the possibility of
the death penalty. 59 "The standard was and remains whether the
plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the
alternative courses of action open to the defendant." 60
With much the same reasoning, the United States Supreme
Court in Corbitt v. New Jersey6 conceded that post-Jackson
practices may encourage guilty pleas; however, the Court further
clarified that such pleas are not needlessly encouraged, but rather,
are a necessary "attribute of any legitimate system which tolerates
52

Id. at 755. "Under this standard, a plea of guilty is not invalid merely

because
entered to avoid the possibility of a death penalty." Id.
53
Id. at 754-55.
4Id. at 755.
5 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
56 Id. at 28-29. The Court stated that a guilty plea entered to avoid the
possibility of the death penalty is not per se invalid. Id.
17Id. at 28.
58 Id. at 31.
59 id.

6 id.
439 U.S. 212 (1978).

61
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Furthermore, the

discretion given a prosecutor to consent to a guilty plea in a
capital case is viewed as an act of leniency, without which a
civilized society
could not tolerate a system of capital
63
punishment.
In the present case, the Appellate Division also based its
decision on recognition of the social utility and necessity of plea
bargaining in our criminal justice system.'
This process of
negotiating sentences was highly regarded by the United States
Supreme Court in Santobello v. United Statess as an "essential
component of the administration of justice. " ' Similarly, the
Court in Bordenkircherv. Hayes67 stated "that the guilty plea and
the often concomitant plea bargain are important components of

this country's criminal justice system.

Properly administered,

they can benefit all concerned." 6
With such encouragemept from the United States Supreme
Court on the practice of plea bargaining, New York courts in
recent decisions have declared State plea bargain provisions to be
constitutional.' In People v. McIntosh,7" defendant, like Michael
Shane Hale in the instant case, attempted to strike down the CPL

I Id. at 220 (quoting Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 31 (1973)). The
Supreme Court upheld the practice of plea bargaining in a capital case despite
the fact that "every such circumstance has a discouraging effect on the
defendant's assertion of his trial rights." Id. at 219 n.8.
I McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312 (1987). The Court noted that
"[d]iscretion in the criminal justice system offers substantial benefits to the
criminal defendant." Id. at 311.
64 Hynes v. Tomei, 666 N.Y.S.2d 687, 693 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1997).
f6 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
6 Id. at 260. The Court noted that without some form of negotiation of
criminal sentencing, the "States and the Federal Government would need to
multiply by many times the number of judges and court facilities." Id.
67 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
1 Id. at 361-62. "Plea bargaining flows from 'the mutuality of advantage' to
defendants and prosecutors, each with his own reasons for wanting to avoid
trial." Id. at 363.
69 See Hynes v. Tomei, 666 N.Y.S.2d 687 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1997).
See also People v. McIntosh, 173 Misc. 2d 727, 682 N.Y.S.2d 214 (Dutchess
County Ct. 1997).
70 173 Misc. 2d 727, 682 N.Y.S.2d 214 (Dutchess County Ct. 1997).
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plea bargain provisions. 7 McIntosh claimed that the provisions
only allow for a death sentence if recommended by a jury after a
trial, and that no such potentiality exists should a defendant plead
guilty. 72 Therefore, "this restriction impermissibly penalizes his
exercise of his right to have a trial .... ..

In its analysis, the

Dutchess County Court cited the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Jackson and likewise distinguished the CPL
provisions from the Federal Kidnapping Act. 74 The true
difference, the court pointed out, is that New York's statute
undermines the power of a defendant to choose, as of right, a
course of action which avoids the death penalty. 75 Indeed, New
York's plea bargain provisions require the consent of both the
prosecutor and the court to prevent a defendant from unilaterally
choosing to avert a death sentence. 76 The court reasoned that
"there is not the chilling effect on the defendant's exercise of his
right to a jury trial as was the case in Jackson because the option
to forego a trial rests not only with [defendant] McIntosh, but
with the district attorney and the court as well." 77 The court went
on to note that the "unilateral nature" of the scheme in Jackson
made the waiver of one's constitutional rights "needless. '
Since the New York statutes are not unilateral in nature and
otherwise afford constitutional protections, a waiver of one's
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights is not "gratuitous. 79 Rather,
a defendant may be offered an opportunity at a "more favorable
outcome" because he/she is not compelled to take the offer.80
"The dynamic of striking an agreement between two equal

71 Id. at 728, 682 N.Y.S.2d at 215 (finding New York's plea bargain statutes

to be in compliance with constitutional mandates).
72 Id.
73

Id.

74 Id. at 729,
75 Id. at 729,

662 N.Y.S.2d at 215-16.
662 N.Y.S.2d at 216.

Id.
77 Id. at 731, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 217.
78 Id. at 733, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 218.
76

Id. at 733, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 219.
8 Id.
79
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participants in the justice system is not per se coercive. " "
Accordingly, the court upheld the constitutionality of the plea
bargain provisions.'
Other states have similarly upheld plea bargain statutes in light
of constitutional attacks. In Ruiz v. State,' the Supreme Court of
Arkansas noted that "the holding in Jackson has been eroded in
recent decisions," ' and found that mere encouragement to plead
guilty is not automatically suspect.8 "The fact that a defendant
agrees to waive trial by jury on the issue of guilt, or the right to
have guilt determined by a jury because the court and state will
waive the death penalty, does not chill an accused's right to a jury
86
trial."
Federal law, under United States v. Jackson, condemns
"needless encouragement of a defendant's waivers of his/her
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.

.

.

,"

and refers to such

8

practice as "evil."
However, as the present decision makes
clear, the dynamic of a plea bargain, wherein a defendant may be
allowed to plead guilty with the consent of the court and the
people, does not result in needless surrender of one's rights;
rather, it grants the defendant an opportunity to negotiate a more
favorable sentence.89

81Id.

at 733, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 218.
82 Id. at 733, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 220.
11 630 S.W.2d 44, 46 (Ark. 1982) (finding that Arkansas' death penalty
statute "does not place an impermissible burden on the exercise of the
constitutional right to trial by jury."). In Rtdz, defendants, convicted and
sentenced to death, sought post conviction relief by claiming that Arkansas'
death penalty statute is violative of one's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.
Id. at 46. Defendants cited the ruling in Jackson to stand for the proposition
that a capital defendant "can be assured of escaping execution only by waiving
his right to a jury trial." Id.
4Id.
8 Id.

at 47.

86 Id.
'

McIntosh, 173 Misc. 2d at 730, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 216.

United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 583 (1968).
v. Tomei, 666 N.Y.S.2d 687, 691 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1997).

89 Hynes
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New York law parallels federal law in its recognition of the
constitutional infirmities present in United States v. Jackson.9'
However, New York's plea bargain provisions, unlike the statute
in Jackson, have been upheld despite constitutional challenges,
because they require prosecutor and defendant to agree on a
prison sentence instead of permitting defendant to unilaterally
choose to avoid the risk of death. 91 This practice of plea
bargaining has "been repeatedly approved by Federal and New
York courts."'
Indeed, the New York Court of Appeals,
recognized as the policy-making tribunal of the State, 93 has
categorically endorsed the plea bargaining process. 94 The system
of negotiating sentences not only alleviates the great volume of
criminal prosecutions, "it provides a means where, by mutual
concessions, the parties may obtain a prompt resolution of
criminal proceedings with all the benefits that inure from final
disposition." 5

COUNTY COURT
DUTCHESS COUNTY
People v. McIntosh"
(decided August 4, 1997)

90 Id. at 690-91.

Id. at 693.
1 McIntosh, 173 Misc. 2d at 730, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 216.
9 Hynes, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 692.
1 See People v. Seaberg, 74 N.Y.2d 1, 541 N.E.2d 1022, 543 N.Y.S.2d
968 (1989).
95Id. at 7, 541 N.E.2d at 1024, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 970 (noting the vital role
that plea bargaining plays in our criminal justice system, "enabl[ing] the
parties to avoid the delay and uncertainties of trial and appeal and permit[ing]
swift and certain punishment of law violators with sentences tailored to the
circumstances of the case at hand") (citation omitted).
9 173 Misc. 2d 727, 662 N.Y.S.2d 214 (Dutchess County Ct. 1997)
91
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